LAC Caution - Xi's Cadre Control - Human Rights - Xinjiang Sanctions & Anger - Chinese Views on US Policy - Lavrov's Visit - Tibet Policy - Bangladesh's Balancing Act
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I. India-China Ties
Let’s begin with reports of the next round of Corps Commander-level talks that are likely to take place this week. Shishir Gupta reports that the talks are “expected to record forward movement in disengagement of armies in the Gogra-Hot Springs area of East Ladakh, people aware of the development said, citing progress made by the two sides during the recent meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on border affairs.” The story also quotes an unidentified Indian military commander as saying that the PLA was moving heavy equipment to its headquarters in Rutog county near the northern bank of Pangong Lake. “But he cautioned that the PLA was concentrating its deployment in Tibet and Xinjiang region across the LAC through long term military plans.”
Here’s more from the report, which tells us that the disengagement that’s happened so far has very limited ground significance. “‘It is quite evident that the PLA will monitor the LAC through electronic surveillance in the future with land force and air force kept on standby in the nearby bases. This way the PLA will not have to station its troops in very high altitude posts in subpolar temperatures while the capacity of the Red Army to deploy remains intact’, said a former Army Chief.”
Here’s how China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) described the disengagement this week during its monthly press conference. It said that “Chinese and Indian front-line troops have disengaged in Pangong Lake area...Thanks to the joint efforts made by the Chinese and Indian sides, the tension in the border areas has been eased distinctly. We hope that the two sides can value the hard-won results, follow the important consensus reached by the leaders of both countries, maintain dialogue and communication, stabilize the situation against relapse, gradually come to solutions that can be accepted by both sides, and jointly maintain peace in the border areas.” So basically, there’s no clarity on next steps.
On the Indian side, Army chief MM Naravane was rather blunt. Speaking at the Times Network’s India Economic Conclave, he said that “The threat has only abated...It has not gone away altogether and unless substantial amount of de-escalation takes place, that is, all the troops who had come in from the other regions...from their permanent garrisons...now are within striking distance of the border if you would put it that way. Unless all these elements also go back we would not be able to really say that things are back to normal.” India’s Chief of Defense Staff General Bipin Rawat, meanwhile, said that India will catch up with China on border infrastructure within 3 to 4 years.
Moving on to matters of the Quad this week. Ananth Krishnan reports that the Biden administration highlighted the strength of US-India ties in its March 19 meeting with Chinese officials in Alaska. The reference to India, it is learnt, was not favourably received by the two Chinese officials. China’s MND this week hit out at the Quad, calling it a mechanism “entrenched in the Cold War mentality” that “advocates bloc confrontation and is obsessed with geopolitical gaming. The countries are ganging up on the pretext of the so-called ‘China challenge’ and blatantly stirring up troubles among regional countries. We are firmly opposed to that.” One more interesting Quad factoid from Chinese media was a Global Times piece, which is currently not accessible, that quoted Zhu Ying of Southwest University of Political Science and Law saying that the Quad could be next in line for sanctions in the context of the recent trading of sanctions around Beijing’s Xinjiang policies.
In another piece in the paper, Qian Feng from the National Strategy Institute at Tsinghua University writes about the potential for India to join NATO. This is honestly a non-issue. But okay, let’s see what he has to say: “Becoming a NATO partner will only bring disadvantages for India. Apart from China, India is also trying to balance between Russia and the US. If India becomes a NATO partner, it will be a huge disaster for India-Russia relations.” Qian then adds: “The practicality of India's decision to become a NATO partner is almost zero. But if it really becomes a partner, this will mean that India's strategy undertakes a fundamental change to completely throw itself into the Western camp. In this case, India will enter a "new" circle. In so doing, it will also offend all members in its "old" circle. This will only put more geopolitical pressure on itself.”
Nevertheless, there is a sense in Beijing about deepening Sino-Indian contestation, which is further extending into the values domain. For instance, here’s Fudan University’s Lin Minwang talking about Indian media’s China coverage. He’s obviously very critical of how the Indian media operates with regard to China. But what’s most interesting: he believes that Indian perceptions of China are increasingly being heavily driven by the ideological prism of democracy and non-democracy. This he says is getting worse.
Finally, there’s a really good, clear-eyed policy paper published by the good folks at the Pune International Center, outlining a vision and recommendations for India to deal with the China challenge. They authors argue that:
“in the short run, India will fare best through participating in coalitions to balance China. These coalitions would naturally consist of countries with shared values and interests...Three groups of countries are our natural partners in such coalition building: (a) the major democracies of the world, (b) the countries in the Indian region and (c) countries that share a border with China, including major powers such as Russia, who are our natural partners in this venture. Building such coalitions including the Quad and others is the need of the hour.” The argument further extends to such coalitions going beyond a situation in which “heads of states play a chess game of foreign policy.” Instead, what is needed is to cultivate “deep connections between the people and from shared interests.”
In the long run, they argue that “there are three critical challenges which India faces: (a) The increased tendency towards government micromanaging the economy, (b) The expanding administrative state and (c) a growing erosion of the rule of law...Indian policy thinking needs to change course in a fundamental way, around these three big themes of scaling back state intervention, restoring the separation of powers and achieving the rule of law. These changes will induce a next phase of high GDP growth, in which India should be able to match Chinese GDP.”
Here’s more: “In economic thinking, China is ahead of India in terms of shedding the autarkic mindset. This is visible in Chinese openness to international trade and FDI and most visible in the area of international finance and RMB internationalisation. There is a need for Indian economic policy to do much more by way of embracing international trade and finance.”
“In military affairs, China is substantially ahead of India on the agenda of modernising the armed forces, of reducing the headcount and increasing the technological intensity behind each soldier. There is a need to fundamentally reorient Indian military spending away from the predominance of wages and pensions towards right sized armed forces who have more modern capabilities, where the share of wages and pensions in overall military expenditure comes down to below half.”
“Alongside these issues, the long-run foundations of Indian success lie in the maturation of the liberal democracy. This requires renewed vigour of protecting civil liberties, enshrining each individual and overcoming the fault lines of caste and creed.”
Finally, they talk about three specific areas in which there is a case for a retreat from engagement with China. These are “restrictions against companies controlled by the Chinese state from having a controlling stake in a hotlist of sensitive infrastructure assets;” “avoid locking into Chinese-controlled technological standards and instead work with global standards processes;” and “police against and block Chinese state surveillance of Indian persons, which appears to often be done through backdoors in network equipment.”
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II. Fujian Tour, Cadre Control, Centenary Celebrations
From Monday to Thursday, Xi Jinping visited Fujian province for an inspection. Xinhua English has a wrap. The report basically offers a wrap of his tour. It says that the inspection trip took Xi to the cities of Nanping, Sanming and Fuzhou. The key aspects mentioned were the environment, focusing on the new development pattern, cultural confidence, and innovation. The key points that are made in the People’s Daily’s report on this are:
Xi spoke about the need to implement the Party Central Committee’s decisions.
He called on cadres to “develop concepts, build a new development pattern, deepen supply-side structural reforms, expand reform and opening up, promote scientific and technological innovation, coordinate epidemic prevention and control and economic and social development, coordinate development and security, and make greater progress in accelerating the construction of a modern economic system.”
He said: “take greater steps in exploring the new path of cross-strait integration and development.”
“Xi Jinping emphasized that our country must rely on innovation to enter the first phalanx of scientific and technological development, blindly following is not feasible, and we must speed up the pace of scientific and technological self-reliance. We must adhere to the core position of innovation in the overall modernization drive, take innovation as a national policy, and actively encourage and support innovation.”
Visiting a park in the city of Wuyishan dedicated to philosopher Zhu Xi, Xi talked about cultural confidence. Xinhua reports, Xi said that: “Special attention should be paid to tapping the essence of the 5,000-year-long Chinese civilization, promoting fine traditional culture, integrating its essence with the Marxist stance, viewpoint and methodology, and unswervingly following the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
Moving on, there have been signals through the week about toughening policy to ensure that local officials and different departments follow the commands of the central leadership. I thought I’d summarise some of the commentaries and the key changes that have been announced this week. But before I do that, just symbolically, heading into the centenary celebrations, there was a message sent this week about Xi’s primacy. A press conference was held this week detailing what the centenary celebrations will entail. A logo for the celebrations was also unveiled. Here’s how the People’s Daily’s report interpreted the logo.
“The number ‘100’ constitutes the basic shape of the logo, and the ‘1’ is presented at an elevation angle of 100 degrees, implying that the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core will unite and lead the whole party, the whole army and the people of all ethnic groups on the road of advancement from victory to new victory.”
Anyway, Monday’s People’s Daily carried a commentary bylined to Zhong Zuwen, believed to be a pseudonym for the Central Organisation Department. It basically directs local level leaders to ensure that they follow the central leadership to fulfil its goals. The piece categorically states: “Upholding and strengthening the party’s overall leadership is the fundamental guarantee for the success...We must insist on establishing a correct employment orientation, strictly control politics, character, ability, work style, and integrity, and resolutely prevent and overcome unhealthy trends in employment...It is necessary to strengthen the overall situation awareness, continuously improve political judgment, political understanding, and political execution ability, with a highly responsible attitude towards the cause of the party and the people, conscientiously perform duties and responsibilities, strengthen follow-up guidance, and unswervingly follow the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important instructions.”
The same edition carried a longish piece by Jing Hanzhao, who is the deputy secretary-general of the Central Political and Legal Committee. This is some serious genuflection to Xi Jinping in the piece. His name gets 20 mentions, and that’s because with regard to everything, i.e., overall situation, legal work, ideological and political quality of professionals, training, etc, related to rule of law, there is a Xi Jinping Thought apparently.
On the next day, there was a piece by Xu Xianming, deputy chairman of the Supervision and Judicial Committee of the NPC. Xu targets a “critical minority” of leading cadres. He wants them to “at all levels must resolutely implement the major decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee.” They must “take the lead in respecting the rule of law, understanding and mastering the law, and continuously improving the use of rule of law thinking and methods to deepen reform…” And they must “refrain from formalism and bureaucratism.” The following day Qu Qingshan, Dean of the Central Party History and Literature Research Institute, wrote about the learning history campaign that’s underway across the country. Qu praises the new book of Xi’s works, which is to be used as teaching material for the history campaign.. He says that the learning history coursework is compulsory for Party members and must be completed. He adds that “centralizing the study and education of party history throughout the party is an inevitable requirement to keep in mind the original mission and to promote the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Apart from other things, to him learning history is critical to improve “political judgment, political understanding, and political execution ability” and build ideological and political consciousness to act in accordance with the requirements laid down by the Party Central Committee with Xi at its core.
Fast forward to Sunday, March 28, we have a new “trial regulation on organizational punishment” that has been issued by the Central Committee. This essentially targets leading cadres, with specific actions identified as problematic and the Organisation Department empowered to demote, dismiss or stop people’s further career progress if they fall foul of central leadership priorities.
III. Tech & Economy
Let’s begin by looking at the Chinese economy. First, Han Wenxiu, deputy director of the Office of the Central Finance and Economics Commission, wrote a piece this week talking about the “new development concept.” The piece says that the concept comprises five aspects: “Innovative development, coordinated development, green development, open development, and shared development.” To fully implement this, he says that “it is necessary to strengthen top-level design and overall coordination, in terms of planning and design, macro guidance, policies and laws, financial investment, work arrangements.” Another important point that he makes is that while all regions and departments must be implementing this concept in their work, this must be done according to one’s “own conditions and possibilities.”
Finally, he emphasises the political significance of all this: “In the overall situation of the party and the country, economy and politics are closely linked. There is no economy away from politics, and there is no politics away from economics...A complete, accurate and comprehensive understanding and implementation of the new development concept is a concrete manifestation of the implementation of the ‘two maintenances’...
Also this week, Li Keqiang met with “overseas representatives” at the China Development Forum. This included “heads of Fortune 500 companies, experts and scholars from internationally renowned academic research institutions, and representatives of major international organizations.” Some of the names mentioned in Chinese media are Apple’s Tim Cook and BMW’s Oliver Zipse. Here’s what Li told them: “We need to balance the relationship between stabilizing growth, ensuring employment, increasing income, and stabilizing prices, let alone exchange high energy consumption and high pollution for economic growth. At the same time, we must strive to increase the activity and efficiency of market players, continue to promote the process of urbanization, release the huge potential of domestic demand, and enhance the driving effect of consumption on economic growth.”
Staying with Li, the State Council’s weekly meeting focussed on “increasing the percentage of R&D expenses deductions for manufacturing enterprises to encourage enterprise innovation and promote industrial upgrading.” What this means in practice is this: starting from January 1, 2021, “the ratio of extra tax deductions on enterprises’ R&D costs have been raised from 75 percent to 100 percent, starting Jan 1 this year. This means that for every 1 million yuan spent on R&D, a company will see 2 million yuan deducted from its taxable income. This policy is expected to reduce corporate taxes by another 80 billion yuan this year, on top of the 360 billion yuan in tax cuts last year.” In addition, the meeting decided that things were still not great for small and micro-sized firms, and that these are critical as employment generators. Therefore, loan repayment deferral and credit loan support policies for small and micro-sized enterprises will be extended to the end of the year.
Moving on, Bloomberg reports that “China’s local governments had 14.8 trillion yuan ($2.3 trillion) of hidden debt last year....Local governments were under pressure to increase infrastructure investment and shore up growth through the pandemic, leading to a 6% rise in off-budget borrowing from a recent low of 13.9 billion yuan in the third quarter of 2019, according to Liu Lei, a senior researcher at the National Institution for Finance and Development. The hidden debt is comprised of funds raised by government-related entities for infrastructure and other public projects that carry an implicit official guarantee of repayment. Bonds sold by local government financing vehicles, or LGFVs, are one way provincial authorities raise money to increase spending without including it on their official balance sheets.” Meanwhile, CNBC reports that data from this year shows that “China is starting to crack down on debt. A first-quarter survey by the China Beige Book released Thursday found that borrowing by state-owned enterprises dropped to the lowest in the study’s roughly 10-year history. Overall borrowing fell to its lowest in three years, while that of large firms hit a five-year low, the report said.” The piece also quotes another report from Allianz, which says that China’s debt-to-GDP ratio rose to 285% as of the end of the third quarter of 2020, up from an average of 251% between 2016 to 2019. The analysts see this stabilisation of debt-to-GDP ratio as a positive sign.
Anyway, Yicai reports that according to China’s Ministry of Finance, the cap on new local government bonds this year is expected to be RMB 4.47 trillion ($686.6 billion). This is 260 billion yuan less than the previous year at the peak of Covid-19 pandemic. But the figure is still well above the RMB3.08 trillion in 2019. As of January this year, the balance of local government debt had reached RMB26 trillion.
Meanwhile, a crackdown on property market lending was launched this week. Caixin reports that the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MHURD) and the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) issued a joint statement Friday announcing a nationwide inspection of business loans, targeting borrowers illicitly using individual or corporate business loans to speculate in the housing market. The inspection is set to be completed by May 31, said the regulators in the statement, pledging to toughen punishments on violators.
Shifting to the technology sector, there are a couple of very interesting reports. First, Beijing today announced tax breaks to spur growth of its semiconductor industry. While details are unclear, chipmakers can now import machinery and raw materials tax-free through 2030. Two stories this week provide a glimpse into the chip challenge that Chinese companies encounter. For instance, China’s EV giant Nio Inc. said on Friday that it will temporarily halt production at one of its factories in Anhui province because of a semiconductor shortage. In the other piece, Emily Feng reports for NPR about the failed experiment of the Wuhan Hongxin Semiconductor Manufacturing Co, which started in a promising fashion before stumbling owing to a severe cash crunch. The story talks about a similar experience of two other chipmakers, before stating that: “The dissolution of Hongxin, Tacoma and Dehuai has led to a cascading chain of bankruptcies in their wake...Chinese policymakers are trying to slow a boom in semiconductor companies, warning against excessive investment and white elephant projects.”
Moving on, there’s much more anti-trust action on the horizon in China. The State Council announced this week that multiple government departments will roll out new policies by September to fight monopolies and prevent “disorderly capital expansion.” The government bodies include the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce and the People’s Bank of China. From the point of view of China’s tech giants, the government’s squeeze seems to be getting tighter.
Reuters reported this week that Tencent chief Pony Ma met with China’s antitrust watchdog officials this month. The piece says that Ma is a parliamentary delegate with Guangdong province, where Tencent is headquartered, and he requested the meeting with SAMR deputy head Gan Lin and other senior officials. It further speculates that Tencent’s WeChat is expected to be the next in line for sharper antitrust regulatory inquiries. A Bloomberg story, meanwhile, argues that the focus is on overhauling Tencent’s massive financial services division. Finally, another Bloomberg report says that Beijing is looking to set up a joint venture with local technology giants that would oversee the lucrative data they collect. The report says that the PBoC is leading this conversation and it envisions the creation of a government-backed entity along with some of China’s biggest e-commerce and payments platforms. I am a little confused by this story, because I thought that something like this already existed in the form of Baihang, which was launched in 2018, in connection with data sharing issues linked to the social credit system.
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China’s industrial profits up 179 per cent at US$169.7 billion in Jan-Feb
In Depth: China’s Long March to Become a Consumer-Driven Economy
Chinese Tech Faces New Curbs on Connecting Banks and Borrowers
IV. Lavrov’s Visit to Guilin
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov traveled to Guilin this week for a meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi. This came soon after the US-China talks in Alaska. What has emerged after the visit is a joint Sino-Russian view on ideological/values-based contestation against the idea of universal rights and what they see as Western conceptions of democracy. Prior to his visit, this is what Lavrov told the Chinese media:
“We regard the new era of Russian-Chinese relations, which you have mentioned, primarily in the context of the broader situation on the international stage. It is undergoing a very deep transformation and the strengthening of the new centres of economic growth, financial might and political influence. Regrettably, the objective trend for a rise of a truly multipolar democratic world is being hindered by some Western countries led by the United States, which would like to preserve their domination of the global economy and international politics at all costs and to force their will and their demands on each and all. In response to this, Russia and China are promoting a constructive unification agenda. We want the architecture of international relations to be fair, democratic, capable of ensuring stability and based on broad interaction of states and their integration associations, just as we are doing together with our Chinese friends by promoting integration in Eurasia. China is a truly strategic partner and a like-minded country for us. Our cooperation on the international stage is having a stabilising effect on the global and regional situation. Russia believes that our dialogue with China based on trust and mutual respect should provide an example for other countries, including those that are trying to develop ties with Russia and China on different principles that are not based on equality. This is not acceptable to us or our Chinese friends. We will continue developing our foreign policy constructively and flexibly, showing readiness for compromise but exclusively on the basis of mutual respect and a balance of interests.”
China’s Foreign Ministry wholeheartedly concurred with that view. But a number of Chinese experts/scholars were keen to argue that an alliance in the conventional sense is unlikely. For instance, here’s Jin Canrong backing the “status quo” in China-Russia ties, adding that talking to Russia after the Anchorage talks is important to “alleviate its (Russia’s) worries,” and “to coordinate future stance towards the United States.” In another piece, Ji Zhiye, former CICIR President, and Russia expert Feng Shaolei dismissing any talk of an alliance. But Feng does say that “If any extremist forces insist on making China and Russia enemies, then China and Russia, which are facing huge external pressure at the same time, will naturally cooperate in a corresponding and appropriate way to resist the pressure.”
Anyway, Xinhua’s report of the talks between Lavrov and Wang said that “the two sides briefed each other on the latest developments of their respective relations with the United States, according to a press release issued after the meeting. The two foreign ministers said the international community believes that the United States should reflect on the damage it has done to global peace and development in recent years, halt unilateral bullying, stop meddling in other countries' domestic affairs, and stop forming small circles to seek bloc confrontation, said the press release. It said the two ministers agreed that all countries should follow the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), uphold true multilateralism, make international relations more democratic, and accept and promote peaceful coexistence and common development of countries with different social systems and development paths.”
They talked about the JCPOA and Afghanistan. On Myanmar, they “voiced the support for all parties in Myanmar to seek a political solution to the current crisis within the constitution and legal framework, avoid further conflict and bloodshed, prevent external forces from taking advantage of the crisis for their own gains, and continue to advance the democratic transition.” Xinhua adds that “the two sides also coordinated positions on a wide range of issues such as UN reform, climate change, Asia-Pacific situation, Syria and Sudan. Finally, the two sides are also talking about the establishment of a regional security dialogue platform to converge a new consensus on resolving the security concerns of countries in the region. Another report talked about the two sides reaching a “strategic consensus,” and discussing possible mutual health code recognition, deepening vaccine cooperation, and partnerships in “5G, big data, the green economy, the internet, climate change, environmental protection and the health industry, working towards the goal of 200 billion U.S. dollars in trade volume.”
In addition, a joint statement issued after the meeting pushed back against the West on human rights, democracy and multilateralism. It also called for “an urgent need to hold a summit of permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.” The key points from the statement are as follows:
It starts with “the global governance system has further become unbalanced, the economic development process has been impacted, new global threats and challenges have emerged one after another, and the world has entered a period of turbulent change.”
The first point talks about human rights. It says that “sustainable development is the foundation” of people to enjoy human rights. It adds that countries should “protect and practice human rights” as per their “national conditions.”
It also calls on all countries to “oppose the politicization of human rights issues, abandon the use of human rights issues to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs and engage in double standards…”
Second point is on democracy, which it says is “one of the achievements of human development.” But adds that “there is no uniform standard for the democratic model. The legitimate right of sovereign countries to independently choose their development path should be respected.”
Point 3 is on international order. It says “Without exception, all countries should firmly maintain the international system with the United Nations as the core and the international order based on international law.”
Here’s more: “We call on the world’s major powers, especially the permanent members of the UN Security Council, to strengthen mutual trust and take the lead in safeguarding international law and the international order based on international law.”
Finally, it calls for countries to “adhere to the principles of open, equal, and non-ideological multilateralism.”
V. Region Watch
When I was assigned the Maldives desk at work four years ago, I thought I had the easiest job in the room. Confident that there would be little to report about the island, I insisted on being assigned one more desk so there would be something “relevant” to work on. My myopic view of the region has changed dramatically since, and I now recognise the “smaller” subcontinent states for their geopolitical significance. While reading the concluding lines of C. Raja Mohan’s Foreign Policy piece, I found my learnings explained with the case of Bangladesh’s strategic salience: “Dhaka has shown increasing agency in playing on the geopolitical chess board and taking advantage of its external environment. Unlike many other countries in Asia, it did not blindly embrace China’s Belt and Road Initiative, but sought to engage multiple partners.” This reasoning finds evidence in Gowher Rizvi's, international affairs advisor to Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, statement at a recent event: “China has a role in Bangladesh. They are an important part of our many development projects. But this is not in any way at the expense of our relationship with India.” The choice, however, is not restricted to Beijing and New Delhi. Raja Mohan explains how Bangladesh has leveraged its geography for economic growth and as a result, prepared itself for more partnerships and alliances. In conversation with Shubhajit Roy, Rizvi revealed that Bangladesh has learnt from the experiences of Sri Lanka and Djibouti on borrowing from China. The interview was carried by Indian Express days following the news that the Central Bank of Sri Lanka and the People's Bank of China had signed a three-year currency swap agreement of about US$ 1.5 billion. It is known that Sri Lanka’s economy is desperate to recover from the pandemic-led setback. There were some reports that suggested President Rajapaksa was revisiting the Hambantota port deal with China, discussing the extension of the 99-year lease. Last week, Sri Lanka’s ambassador to China Palitha Kohona, dismissed the reports by calling them “absolute rubbish”, Laura Zhou reported.
Now, from the Maldives desk. Ten days after being approved, the first lot of 100,000 Sinopharm vaccine doses was received by Foreign Affairs Minister Abdulla Shahid on Wednesday, writes Zunana Zalif. In neighbouring Pakistan, Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi spoke with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi, to secure the supply of the vaccine in the coming few months as the nation experiences its third COVID-19 wave.
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VI. Sanctions & Human Rights
Over the past week, we’ve seen an unprecedented escalation of tensions between China and the West broadly. It began on Monday, with the EU announcing sanctions. The EU imposed travel bans and asset freezes on Chen Mingguo, director of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau, as well as senior Chinese officials Wang Mingshan and Wang Junzheng. The former head of China's Xinjiang region, Zhu Hailun, was also targeted. The construction company hit with sanctions was the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Public Security Bureau. Later in the day, the US, UK and Canada issued a joint statement. It said that “Today, we have taken coordinated action on measures, in parallel to measures by the European Union, that send a clear message about the human rights violations and abuses in Xinjiang. We are united in calling for China to end its repressive practices against Uyghur Muslims and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang, and to release those arbitrarily detained.” These too targeted (US Treasury’s note) Wang Junzheng and Chen Mingguo.
In response, China’s MoFA criticised the EU’s sanctions, saying that they were “based on nothing but lies and disinformation, disregards and distorts facts, grossly interferes in China's internal affairs, flagrantly breaches international law and basic norms governing international relations, and severely undermines China-EU relations.” It also adopted “countermeasures.” 10 individuals, including Adrian Zenz and Member of European Parliament Reinhard Butikofer have been sanctioned. In addition, 4 institutions, the Political and Security Committee of the Council of the European Union, the Subcommittee on Human Rights of the European Parliament, the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Germany, and the Alliance of Democracies Foundation in Denmark, have been sanctioned. MoFA’s statement says that “the individuals concerned and their families are prohibited from entering the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of China. They and companies and institutions associated with them are also restricted from doing business with China.”
The sanctions immediately put a pause on the process for the EU Parliament to approve the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investments. On March 23, the European Union Parliament, whose approval is mandatorily required for passing the CAI, cancelled its review meeting on the agreement. The Parliament’s second largest group, the center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, made clear that the lifting of Chinese sanctions was a condition to the resumption of CAI talks. In addition, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Denmark summoned their Chinese ambassadors.
In the days that followed, Beijing announced more sanctions. On Friday, China sanctioned nine individuals and four entities on the UK side “that maliciously spread lies and disinformation.” These include Tom Tugendhat, Iain Duncan Smith, Neil O'Brien, David Alton, Tim Loughton, Nusrat Ghani, Helena Kennedy, Geoffrey Nice, Joanne Nicola Smith Finley, China Research Group, Conservative Party Human Rights Commission, Uyghur Tribunal, Essex Court Chambers. The statement said that “as of today, the individuals concerned and their immediate family members are prohibited from entering the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of China, their property in China will be frozen, and Chinese citizens and institutions will be prohibited from doing business with them. China reserves the right to take further measures.” A day later, sanctions were announced against the Chair of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) Gayle Manchin, Vice Chair of the USCIRF Tony Perkins, Member of Parliament of Canada Michael Chong, and the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development of the House of Commons of Canada. The statement said that “the individuals concerned are prohibited from entering the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of China, and Chinese citizens and institutions are prohibited from doing business with the relevant individuals and having exchanges with the relevant entity.”
Here’s how US Secretary of State Antony Blinken responded to the sanctions: “Beijing’s attempts to intimidate and silence those speaking out for human rights and fundamental freedoms only contribute to the growing international scrutiny of the ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang. We stand in solidarity with Canada, the UK, the EU, and other partners and allies around the world in calling on the PRC to end the human rights violations and abuses against predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang and to release those arbitrarily detained.”
Then, there was the whole H&M saga that’s playing out, although it’s not just H&M. China Briefing informs that leading Western apparel brands, including H&M, Nike, Adidas, and Burberry, have faced backlash and boycotts in China for the corporate statements they made last year about concerns over allegations around forced labor in Xinjiang. Reuters reports that Chinese apps, e-commerce platforms and celebrities have participated in the pushback against these brands. For example, reports inform of H&M not being searchable on Didi’s app, and Huawei removing Nike and Adidas from its app store. There’s also been a barrage of criticism of these firms on social media and in Chinese media. For instance, here’s one piece saying that Western firms have made “fools of themselves” over the issue of forced labour in Xinjiang’s cotton fields. In Global Times, Chinese analysts are talking about how these firms cannot succeed “if they have no respect for local markets and local consumers.” China’s foreign ministry, meanwhile, has adopted an incredibly aggressive posture. Here’s just one of Hua Chunying’s attacks this week:
She said that these countries had taken “so-called ‘evidence’ maliciously fabricated by some anti-China politicians and scholars” to justify their actions. “They have even taken out of context and distorted Chinese official documents and data. All this proves that it’s never human rights and truth that they care about. They just do not want to see China's success, development and better livelihood. That's why they have been using human rights issues as a pretext for interfering in China's internal affairs and frustrate China's development.” She then lashed out at the West’s “ignoble record on human rights.” This went from slave trade to Black Lives Matter; German colonists killing indigenous Namibian tribes to the Holocoust; from French colonialism in Alegeria to the war in Afghanistan; from the 1870s violence against the indegenous people in Canada to wars in Syria and Libya.
Then she said: “These countries show no repentance over the turmoil they created in other countries, and even go further to impose unilateral sanctions on others in the name of human rights, severely jeopardizing the rights to life, health and development of people in relevant countries. In the face of the epidemic, these above-mentioned most developed countries have turned a blind eye to their people's rights to life and health, leading to losses of tens of hundreds of lives. In pursuit of ‘vaccine nationalism’, they've hoarded vaccines far in excess of their population's needs, leaving developing countries struggling with insufficient vaccines. We can't help but ask: how could people have any right if they lost their lives? The United States and the West have been trumpeting protecting human rights, but who and what right on earth are they protecting? In what way are they respecting and protecting human rights? Shouldn't they feel ashamed?”
A day later, Hua lashed out at Western firms, saying that “the Chinese people wouldn't allow foreigners to reap benefits in China on the one hand and smear China on the other. China is open and we welcome foreign enterprises and people to do business, live and work in China. And we reject any malicious attack on China and even attempts to undermine China's interests on the basis of rumors and lies.”
Here’s another statement as reported in SCMP: Xu Guixiang, a Xinjiang government spokesman, said at a press conference with the foreign ministry on Monday that multinational companies should understand that wielding the “big stick of sanctions” against Xinjiang would hurt the businesses themselves, and called on businesses not to “politicise economic behaviours”. “China is no longer the China of 1840, and the era when Chinese people suffered from great power hegemony, and bullying will never return again,” he said, referring to the “century of humiliation” when China signed unequal treaties with Western powers. “We hope that businesses like H&M will be more clear-eyed and distinguish right from wrong.”
The theme of China’s colonial past and the West’s history of slave trade and labour has been prominent in mainstream and social media too in China. For example, here’s Chinese artist Wuheqilin’s latest piece hitting back at the West on criticism of forced labour in Xinjiang.
My Take: This is becoming a bit of a pattern on the issues of values. Beijing seems to be pulling out everything that it can conceive of to lash out at others. These comments along with the focus on disinformation and human rights in the conversation between Wang and Lavrov tell us that there’s going to be intense contestation going ahead. This contestation is not merely about rhetorical point-scoring; this is about swaying domestic and international opinion, while reordering international norms and conventions.
Finally, China issued its annual report on US human rights. The English report is available via Xinhua. If you’ve been following this space, then this is pretty much what was expected. Let me just point out the headers from the report; it will give you a flavour of what it contains:
“Incompetent Pandemic Containment Leads to Tragic Outcome.” This is about the management of the pandemic by the Trump administration.
“American Democracy Disorder Triggers Political Chaos.” This is about the tensions and chaos that followed the 2020 election, and political polarisation in the US.
“Ethnic minorities devastated by racial discrimination.” This covers American Indians, Asian Americans, African Americans and police brutality, etc.
“Continuous Social Unrest Threatens Public Safety.” This covers crime rates, gun violence, George Flyod’s death, and so on.
“Growing Polarization Between Rich and Poor Aggravates Social Inequality.” This covers unemployment, economic inequality, and health insurance coverage, etc.
“Trampling on International Rules Results in Humanitarian Disasters.” This covers withdrawal from WHO and Paris accord. In addition, it talks about sanctions, treatment of migrants, pardoning of Blackwater contractors convicted of war crimes in Iraq, etc.
There have also been commentaries linked to the report. So here’s a Zhong Sheng commentary in People’s Daily, saying that “There is no universal human rights development path in the world. Human rights protection is not the best, only better. We support countries in the world to strengthen human rights exchanges and cooperation based on the principle of mutual respect, but we oppose double standards to attack and discredit other countries, and oppose human rights issues to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs...It is hoped that the United States can put aside its hypocrisy, dominance, big stick and double standards, meet the international community halfway, and jointly build a community with a shared future for mankind.”
Here’s another under the same byline: “The vast majority of developing countries oppose a few Western countries' double standards on human rights issues...The trick of pretending to be a ‘human rights teacher’ in a few Western countries has long been unsuccessful, and the hypocrisy is well known in the world. These Western countries are advised to remove their pretense, abandon the Cold War mentality of using human rights as a tool for realizing hegemony, face up to their own human rights issues, strengthen dialogue and cooperation based on the principle of mutual respect...”
VII. China-US Ties
All this acrimony on human rights aside, there are some interesting developments in the bilateral Sino-US dynamic, and also in connection with Antony Blinken’s visit to Europe. First, in general, Chinese analysts tend to seem rather upbeat following the Alaska talks. I’d covered some comments in last week’s newsletter. Here’s China’s ambassador to the US Cui Tiankai telling CNN that the dialogue “certainly helped both sides to have a better understanding of the other. So I hope this will be the beginning of a long process of dialogue, communication and hopefully coordination between the two sides.”
Then there’s Jin Canrong, who believes that the outcomes were “better than expected.” He adds that “the performance of the two diplomatic teams has been approved in their respective countries. On the contrary, they will cooperate well in the future, because this means that there are fewer domestic restrictions, so it is actually a good thing.” CICIR’s Yuan Peng argues that rather than being swayed by the theatrics that took place, it’s important to focus on the “comprehensiveness and constructive significance of this dialogue.” He emphasises US reiteration of the one-China policy. Here’s more (I’ve edited this text below significantly; therefore not using quotes):
In this dialogue, although the two sides have presented their differences and their respective positions...there are still common interests and need for cooperation between the two sides. First of all, the Biden administration’s domestic political agenda needs cooperation with China, whether it is in terms of epidemic prevention and control or economic recovery. Second, on major international issues, such as nuclear non-proliferation and climate change, the United States cannot do without China. Third, the reshaping or reconstruction of a new round of international order is inseparable from the cooperation between China and the United States no matter what.
He then criticises the Biden administration for not yet having a clear picture or framework for Sino-US ties. He talks about US politicians being caught in the electoral/4-year cycle and not being able to think in terms of the big, long-term picture. This is followed by a dig at the US alliance system. He talks about how US allies have “soberly realized after Trump’s four-year term that pinning their destiny in the United States will only harm their own interests in the end, because no one can guarantee that they will not come again in four years...So the US allies continue to cherish the commonality and traditional relationship between them and the US in terms of values, ideology, democracy and human rights, and at the same time, they are also thinking about how to maintain a certain degree of strategic autonomy.”
Now, with this said, Blinken was in Brussels this week. He spoke at the NATO meeting, framing the challenges for the alliance, with China being a priority. In fact, China led the list of military and non-military threats to the alliance. You can access my breakdown of Blinken’s speech here. In addition, Blinken and Josep Borrell also launched the US-EU dialogue on China. Borrell said that it will comprise “meetings at the senior official and expert levels on topics such as reciprocity, economic issues, resilience, human rights – human rights, security, multilateralism, and areas for constructive engagement with China such as climate change.”
Another example of Beijing’s view of the bilateral relationship with the US is this piece under the byline 梅齐楚, Mei Qichu, which was published in People’s Daily this week. The person is referred to as an observer of international affairs. The author talks about the Anchorage dialogue, saying that the following points about this conversation were noteworthy:
“The US Secretary of State and National Security Advisor jointly conducted a "2+2" dialogue with the main persons in charge of foreign affairs on the Chinese side. This is unprecedented for both China and the United States and in the history of Sino-US exchanges. The two sides held three dialogues on domestic policy, foreign policy, and bilateral relations, covering a wide range of bilateral, regional, and global issues, lasting nearly 9 hours. The above highlights the breadth and depth of Sino-US relations, and also reflect the importance and complexity of current Sino-US relations.”
“Facing the malicious provocation by the US, Director Yang Jiechi, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi sternly clarified China's position, made impromptu speeches, refuted the US slander, detailed the US's crimes, and hit the US side by surprise...The two rounds of confrontation were broadcast live in front of the whole world, which severely hit the arrogance of the US. The U.S. originally wanted to teach China a lesson, but unexpectedly, China turned its back on defense and showed the world a textbook-style diplomatic counterattack lesson. China’s statement has aroused enthusiastic repercussions at home, and has also aroused strong resonance in the international community, especially in countries that have been bullied by the United States for a long time.”
“It is hoped that the United States will truly realize China's determination and will, change its course, rather than intensify it, and go further and further down the wrong path. China will continue to listen to what it says and watch what it does.”
“Judging from the briefings and related press releases after the meeting, although both sides acknowledged that the two countries have major differences, they also mentioned the need for cooperation...The Sino-US interaction in the new era will never go back to the unhealthy pattern of the US unilaterally leading the way, cooperating if it wants to cooperate, and stopping if it wants to stop. China will not engage in dialogue for the sake of dialogue, nor will it accept dialogue that presupposes the resolution of US unilateral concerns. The dialogue must not be a unilateral draw by the US, but a balanced resolution of the concerns of both sides. These are all powerful messages that China has conveyed to the US through this dialogue.”
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VIII. Tougher Tibet Policy
In the People's Daily on March 25, 2021, Che Dalha, who is the Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region, wrote about connecting Tibet better to the mainland, not just physically but also in a deeper sense of identity. He starts from Xi’s call at the Tibet work conference last year about digging out historical information to this effect. Che argues that “a large number of studies in history, anthropology, linguistics, and biology have shown that Tibet has a long history of communication with the inland of the motherland, Tibetans and other ethnic groups.” He then goes on to provide what he says are some examples of this and points out the economic development that’s taken place.
What he wants going ahead is for the Party to “adhere to the general tone of the work of seeking progress while maintaining stability, forge a sense of the Chinese nation’s community, and promote greater development of various undertakings in Tibet and reach a new level.”
He also calls to “steadily promote the formulation and revision of various administrative regulations and local regulations in Tibet to maintain the unity of the rule of law in the country. Continue to strengthen party building, especially political building, and carry out in-depth special education on ‘political standards, stricter party spirit, and stronger organizational discipline’.” This is interesting in that it could potentially mean that autonomy would further be eroded, with stricter assimilationist policies being adopted.
Here’s more to support my view: “Vigorously cultivate and practice the core values of socialism...educate the people in the region, and deeply understand that the Chinese nation is a community with a shared future. Promote the national common spoken and written language education, continue to consolidate and upgrade the results of education reform and construction, and build 18 Putonghua proficiency test stations. Take multiple measures to cultivate and practice the core values of socialism, implement the visual image project of the Chinese nation, compile a batch of reading books and textbooks that have built the sense of community of the Chinese nation, and build historical exhibition halls...so that Chinese culture has always been the emotional bond and spiritual belonging of all ethnic groups in Tibet.”
And this: “Encourage and guide Tibetan college graduates to work and start businesses in the Mainland, and attract Mainland enterprises and individuals to start businesses in Tibet.”
Here’s more on local cadre: “The people of all ethnic groups in Tibet share the same heart with the people of all ethnic groups in the country, cherishing national unity as cherishing life, and the consciousness of the Chinese nation's community is deeply integrated into the blood of the people of all ethnic groups in Tibet. Cadres in ethnic areas, especially ethnic minority leading cadres, must strengthen the ‘four consciousnesses’, strengthen the ‘four self-confidence’, and achieve the ‘two safeguards’, continuously improve political judgment, political understanding, and political execution ability, and constantly improve their grasp of the new the development stage, the political ability to implement the new development concept, the construction of a new development pattern, the strategic vision, and the professional level, and consciously assume the responsibility and mission of forging a sense of community of the Chinese nation.”
Finally, on the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation: “Adhere to the unshakable direction of Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism, and strengthen the promotion of the laws and regulations, religious rituals and historical customization of the reincarnation of the living Buddha, so that the reincarnation of the living Buddha must adhere to the important principle of ‘domestic search, golden vase drawing, and central approval’.”
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